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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum
RSB-175, November 1, 1962

TO : The Secretary
 THROUGH: S/S
 FROM : I.I.R - Roger Hilsman *Roger Hilsman*
 SUBJECT: Moscow's Current Goal: Minimize Inspection --
Maximize Assurances for Castro

Latest developments -- including the Soviet assurance to U Thant that the missiles in Cuba will be dismantled by November 2 -- suggest that Moscow still means to go through with the basic provisions of the Kennedy-Khrushchev arrangement, but that in doing so it will seek to keep verification to a minimum while obtaining maximum further guarantees for Castro.

This paper briefly summarizes the latest developments and assesses their significance. It is written on the assumption that U Thant has been accurately informed of Soviet intentions -- an assumption which cannot be confirmed at least until the results of today's reconnaissance flights are in.

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The Soviet plan to dismantle missile bases by tomorrow can, if actually implemented, put the USSR in an optimum negotiating position to resist US pressures on questions connected with verification while demanding more in the way of US assurances to the Castro regime.

1. Soviet Schedule for Dismantling Sites

In Havana, Soviet General Stazenko informed U Thant and General Rikhye that orders to begin dismantling had been received in Cuba between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m. on Sunday, October 28, and that work began at 5:00 p.m. (this is not confirmed nor necessarily disproven by our own reconnaissance on Monday). Missiles and major equipment will be removed from the sites by tomorrow and bulldozing of the sites will begin then. In New York, Kuznetsov told McCloy yesterday that the dismantling of "relevant facilities" would be completed either November 2 or 3.

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Kuznetsov said he did not know the precise details of what dismantling would entail. While no mention was made of aircraft, the Secretary General in Havana had the impression that all of the equipment in the hands of the Soviet military would be withdrawn together with the Soviet personnel. TASS published U Thant's public statement that he had been reliably informed of the dismantling of the missile sites.

2. Aerial Reconnaissance Discouraged

At the same time both the Soviets and the Cubans attempted to discourage US or UN aerial reconnaissance. When told that the US would resume reconnaissance today, and that a dangerous situation would arise if surveillance planes were shot at or downed, Kuznetsov replied that all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba were in Cuban hands. In Havana, Castro strongly opposed aerial reconnaissance of any kind as well as inspection on Cuban soil.

3. Implications for Further Negotiations

The Soviet timetable outlined above refers to the dismantling of the equipment, and not to its return to the USSR. Once having carried it out, the Soviets would regard themselves in a strong position for further negotiations.

- They would have made a forthcoming gesture to which world opinion would expect the US to respond.
- Their reputation for probity, badly damaged by American evidence of their secretive installation of the missiles, would at least in part be restored and the US rationale for demanding strict controls would be undercut.
- Meanwhile the crisis would appear to world opinion to have receded, and the pressure on the USSR to meet US demands would be reduced.
- At the same time, the Soviet missiles though in storage rather than on launchers would still be in Cuba and Moscow would still have bargaining value.

4. Quarantine

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Kuznetsov already indicated the form of such bargaining yesterday when he observed to McCloy that the length of time required for shipping the equipment back to the USSR would

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[depend on the availability of shipping which in turn would depend on the US position with respect to the quarantine. The persuasiveness of Kuznetsov's line of reasoning is perhaps illustrated by the Secretary General's statement last night to Ambassador Stevenson that he believed that the "blockade" was no longer necessary.]

However, Kuznetsov did not oppose Red Cross (ICRC) inspection of incoming shipping to Cuba, and even Castro acquiesced in inspection of ships at sea (but not in Cuba).

5. Verification

The Soviets apparently hope that by implementing half of the first phase of the removal without verification, they will be able to minimize US demands for further verification. The Soviets will almost certainly want to reduce to a minimum the controls required in order to:

- (1) reduce Cuban opposition,
- (2) avoid setting a precedent which might be used against them in disarmament negotiations, and
- (3) prevent the further US intelligence gain that would result from observation of the act of dismantling.

However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets may invite UN representatives to witness the dismantling of revetments in order to vividly demonstrate their fulfillment of their part of the bargain. In so doing they would hope to convey the impression that such measures as inspection of other locations, inspection of the actual movement out of Cuba, overflights and continuing control over possible reintroduction of Soviet missiles were unnecessary.

6. Guarantees for Cuba

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[Kuznetsov indicated that Moscow will seek further US guarantees for the Castro regime. He suggested that to give substance to the assurance that no invasion will take place from the US or a Latin American country, there ought to be a guarantee that no invasion preparations were occurring and that there would be no subversive activities directed against Cuba whether in the US or in other Latin American countries.]

Meanwhile Moscow propaganda continues playing up the theme of danger to Cuba, alleging US bad faith in the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of letters, and supporting Castro's five demands. Polyakov, Izvestiya's authoritative

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commentator, said on October 31 that fulfillment of these demands is necessary to guarantee Cuba's security.

7. Mikoyan Trip

Castro remained adamant in his opposition to all forms of inspection on Cuban territory, and indicated to U Thant that he had been embittered by Khrushchev's sending his October 23 letter to the President without first consulting him.

Mikoyan is en route to Cuba, apparently to cajole Castro into agreeing to an arrangement which the US might accept. Inclusion of Alikhanov (Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations) on the delegation suggests that additional economic aid may be forthcoming. References in Soviet propaganda to the effect that the USSR will not leave Cuba undefended suggest the possibility that Mikoyan may offer the Cubans a formal alliance; however, on balance it appears doubtful that Castro would value such an assurance at a time when he feels betrayed, or that the Soviets want to deepen and further formalize their military commitment.

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